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LIST OF PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING IN THE COURT 
WHOSE JUDGMENT IS SOUGHT TO BE REVIEWED 
The following is a complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the Court whose 
judgment is sought to be reviewed. Not all are parties to this appeal. [ 
1. Brasher's Auto Auction, d/b/a Brasher's Salt Lake Auto Auction - Plaintiff. Plaintiffs 
complaint against Defendants was dismissed with prejudice June 11th, 2001 pursuant to a 
settlement agreement. Brasher's is not a party to the appeal. ? 
2. Shar's Cars, a limited liability company - Defendant, Third Party Plaintiff, and 
Appellant. Shar's Cars, LLC, is a party to the appeal. Shar's Cars, LLC is hereafter referred to 
as "Shar's Cars". 
3. Jeffrey D. Birschbach - Defendant, Third Party Plaintiff, and Appellant. Birschbach is 
a party to the appeal. Jeffrey D. Birschbach is hereafter referred to as "Creditor Birschbach". 
4. Western Surety Company - Defendant. The Plaintiffs complaint against Defendant 
was dismissed with prejudice June 11th, 2001 pursuant to a settlement agreement. This 
Defendant is not a party to the appeal. 
5. Sharla Birschbach - Third Party Plaintiff. Third Party Plaintiffs complaint against 
the Third Party Defendants was dismissed with prejudice at trial December 5th, 2002. This Third 
Party Plaintiff is not a party to the appeal. 
6. Deloy Elder - Third Party Defendant, Appellee, and Cross-Appellant. Deloy Elder is a 
party to the appeal and is hereafter referred to as "Elder". 
7. Bruce Rutherford - Third Party Defendant. The Court entered a default judgment 
against this Third Party Defendant on motion of Third Party Plaintiffs December 31st, 2002. 
-ii-
Rutherford is not a party to the appeal. Bruce Rutherford is hereafter referred to as "Rutherford". 
-iii-
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SHAR'S CARS, LLC, a Utah limited liability company 
and JEFFREY D. BIRSCHBACH, 
Appellants and Cross-Appellee, 
vs. 
DELOY ELDER, 
Appellee and Cross-Appellant 
CaseNo.20030082-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this proceeding pursuant to Utah Code Anno. §§ 
78-2-2(3)0), 78-2-2(4), and 78-2a-3(2)(j), (1953), as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
REGARDING THE CROSS-APPEAL 
The following issues are presented for review pursuant to the Appellee's cross-appeal. 
1. Whether the trial court erred in making its determination that Elder breached the 
contract. This is a mixed question of fact and law. Mostrong v. Jackson, 866 P.2d 573 (Utah 
App. 1993). 
Standard of Review: Factual findings of the trial court are upheld unless they are 
clearly erroneous. Kraatz v. Heritage Imports. 2003 UT App 201. Legal conclusions are 
reviewed for correctness, giving the trial court's conclusion no particular deference. Id. 
This issue was a contested issue throughout the trial and preserved for appeal. Tr. 
1 
at 1359, pp. 225-230; 326 - 328; 357-358. 
2. Whether the trial court erred in deciding that the subsequent agreement between Shar's 
Cars and Rutherford did not constitute a full release of liability pursuant to partnership law, 
novation, executory accord, accord and satisfaction, release, waiver or estoppel. This is a mixed 
question of fact and law. Mostrong v. Jackson, supra. 
Standard of Review: Factual findings of the trial court are upheld unless they are 
clearly erroneous. Kraatz v. Heritage Imports, supra. Legal conclusions are reviewed for 
correctness, giving the trial court's conclusion no particular deference. Id. 
This issue was a contested issue throughout the trial and preserved for appeal. 
Tr. at 1359, pp. 225 - 229; 328 - 329; 332 - 334; 338 - 344; 358.. 
3. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that general and/or consequential damages 
were capable of determination with reasonable certainty or within the contemplation of the 
contracting parties. This is a mixed question of fact and law. Mostrong v. Jackson, supra. 
Standard of Review: Factual findings of the trial court are upheld unless they are 
clearly erroneous. Kraatz v. Heritage Imports, supra. Legal conclusions are reviewed for 
correctness, giving the trial court's conclusion no particular deference. Id. 
This issue was a contested issue throughout the trial and preserved for appeal. Tr. 
i 
at 1359, pp. 244; 345-346; 348; 360-361. 
4. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the amount of damages is $45,000. 
Standard of Review: This is a factual finding for which the clearly erroneous 
standard of appellate review applies. Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 
1989). > . ,, -. • • r <, h. 
This issue was a contested issue throughout the trial and preserved for appeal. Tr. 
at 1359, pp. 244; 345-346; 348; 3260-361. 
5. Whether the trial court erred in denying Elder's motion to dismiss at the conclusion of 
Shar's Cars and Creditor Birschbach's case in chief. 
Standard of Review: This is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness, 
giving the trial court's conclusion no particular deference. Cook v. Zions First National Bank, 
2002 UT 105, 57 P.3d 1084. 
This issue was preserved for appeal pursuant to Elder' s motion to dismiss 
brought at the conclusion of Creditor Birschbach's case in chief. Tr. at 1359 pp 225 - 244 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action for breach of contract. The case was initiated by Brasher's Auto 
Auction, dba Brasher's Salt Lake Auto Auction, a corporation, July 8th, 1999, against Shar's 
Cars, LLC, Jeffrey D. Birschbach, Sharla Birschbach and Western Surety Company. Defendants 
Shar's Cars, LLC, Jeffrey D. Birschbach and Sharla Birschbach answered and filed a Third Party 
Complaint against Third Party Defendants Deloy Elder and Bruce Rutherford August 17th, 1999. 
Third Party Defendant Deloy Elder answered. Third Party Defendant Bruce Rutherford never 
did. A default judgment was entered against Rutherford December 31st, 2002. 
Plaintiff Brasher's Auto Auction settled its claims against Defendants, Shar's Cars, 
Birschbachs and Western Surety Complaint. Plaintiffs complaint against the defendants was 
dismissed with prejudice June 11th, 2001. 
The Third Party Plaintiffs case against Third Party Defendant Deloy Elder came on for 
trial December 4th, and 5th, 2002. At the conclusion of Third Party Plaintiffs' case in chief, the 
claims of Third Party Plaintiff Sharla Birschbach were dismissed with prejudice. Elder's motion 
to dismiss all other counts and claims of the Third Party Plaintiffs' case was denied. At the 
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conclusion of the trial, judgment was entered against Third Party Defendant Deloy Elder in favor 
of Third Party Plaintiffs Shar's Cars, LLC and Jeffrey D. Birschbach. The judgment was 
docketed on December 31st, 2002in the amount of $22,500.00. 
Third Party Plaintiffs, Shar's Cars, LLC and Jeffrey D. Birschbach, filed their notice of 
appeal January 21st, 2003. Third Party Defendant Deloy Elder filed his notice of cross-appeal 
January 29th, 2003. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Creditor Birschbach and Shar's Cars 
Creditor Birschbach is the sole owner of a successful company, American Union 
Mortgage. It sells and brokers mortgages to the public. Tr. at 1358 at pp. 49-55. His wife, 
Sharla, a stay at home mom, discussed the idea of operating a home business. The idea was that 
it would be fun to go to an auto auction, buy a car, and offer it for sale while driving it, 
essentially one at a time. Tr. at 1358, pp. 32 - 34; 56-57 
They decided to call this home business "Shar's Cars", after Creditor Birschbach's wife's 
name, Sharla. Creditor Birschbach then organized the business as a limited liability company, 
naming himself as the only member and manager. Tr. at 1358, pp. 57; 60; 61-62. He also 
opened a company checking account in the name of Shar's Cars at Zions Bank in October, 1997. 
Tr. at 1358, pp. 58 - 59. Ultimately, Creditor Birschbach obtained a bond and was issued a Utah 
motor vehicle dealer's license about January, 1998. Tr. at 1358 pp. 29 - 30; 57. 
II. Elder's and Rutherford's Business. 
Elder and Rutherford were in business together wholesaling cars. It was a partnership 
they recently started. They were operating as licensed salesmen under a person who had a 
dealer's license in Cache County, Utah. Tr at 1358, pp. 67-69. They were hoping to find a 
person in Salt Lake County with a dealer's license so they could operate the business under that 
4 •:• 
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license instead, for convenience. Tr. at 1358. pp. 69-70 
III. The Verbal Contract ^ 
Creditor Birschbach and Elder were acquaintances back when they were growing up in 
Cache County, Utah. They were not really friends. Tr. at 1358, pp. 55-56. They had a chance 
encounter at an auto auction in late January or early February, 1998, which led to a meeting 
between Elder and Rutherford, and Creditor Birschbach. Tr. at 1358, pp. 12-14; 29-30; 65 - 66. 
The middle to the third week of February of 1998, they met at a restaurant and there 
entered into a verbal contract. Tr. at 1358, pp. 6 - 7; 31. The terms of the agreement were: 1) 
Elder and Rutherford would continue to carry on their own business (selling vehicles retail and 
wholesale), becoming licensed salesmen under Creditor Birschbach's dealer's license; Tr. at 
1358, pp. 7-8; 31; 2) Elder and Rutherford's business would be conducted and kept separate 
from that of Creditor Birschbach, his wife, and the limited liability company, with Elder and 
Rutherford paying their own expenses and distributing profits between them pursuant to their 
own partnership agreement; Tr. at 1358, p. 7; 3) In consideration, Elder and Rutherford agreed to 
pay Creditor Birschbach $100 from the sale of every vehicle sold retail, (not wholesale), pay the 
operating expenses for Shar's Cars, the LLC, and help Creditor Birschbach learn how to purchase 
cars at auctions; Tr. at 1358, pp. 7-8; 31-32; 34-35. Also contemplated within the terms of the 
agreement was Elder and Rutherford finding and opening a retail car lot and agreeing to pay all 
the expenses for that. Tr. at 1358, pp. 31- 32; 34. \\( 
It was also agreed that Elder and Rutherford's partnership business would operate under 
the name of Shar's Cars. But that would be separate from Creditor Birschbach's and his wife's 
home Shar's Cars LLC business. The limited liability company's business would be transacted 
through its own Shar's Cars Zions Bank acct. Elder and Rutherford's business would be 
operated independent of creditor Birschbach's limited liability company. Tr. at 1358. pp. 32-33 
From Creditor Birschbach's standpoint, it was great way to have all of his expenses 
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covered for his and his wife's home business. Tr. at 1358, p 3. Additionally, Creditor 
Birschbach was motivated by the idea that if Elder and Rutherford sold 15-20 cars a month, that 
was $1500 to $2000 per month to him with no expense. Tr. at 1358, p. 36 
IV. The Course of Conduct after Entering into the Contract. 
After entering into the foregoing contract, Creditor Birschbach and his wife conducted 
their home Shar's Cars business separate from the business of Elder and Rutherford. Tr. at 1358, 
pp. 59 - 62; 70-71. While they operated their respective businesses separate from each other, 
they operated under the same name - "Shar's Cars" - with Creditor Birschbach operating as an 
LLC, granting a right to Elder and Rutherford to operate their business under the same name as a 
d/b/a, (the retail car lot subsequently opened by Elder and Rutherford had to have the dealer's 
name and license number at the physical location.) Tr. at 1358, pp. 62-65. Neither Creditor 
Birschbach nor Elder or Rutherford had any right to manage the others' business or participate in 
division of profits or be liable for expenses as to their separate businesses outside of the 
aforementioned contractual obligations. Tr. at 1358. pp. 63-65. 
For example, Creditor Birschbach's Shar's Cars LLC account was at Zions Bank and the 
transactions handled through that account related solely to his and his wife's home business, plus 
receipt of the contractual proceeds related to the Elder and Rutherford contract. On the other 
hand, Elder and Rutherford conducted their own business through their own Shar's Cars dba 
account with a separate bank, Washington Mutual, managing their own business. This was 
principally how business under the verbal contract was conducted up to about August 15th, 1998. 
Tr. at 1358, pp. 12; 14-17; 22; 25-26; 37-38; 73-84. 4 
One change occurred in June, 1998. Creditor Birschbach extended a loan to Elder and 
Rutherford for $25,000 to be paid back within 30 to 60 days. Tr. at 1358, pp. 15 - 16; 37 - 40. 
The money came from a loan that Creditor Birschbach took out on a five to six year term with 
payments of about $500 to $600 per month. The loan was not paid back by the time that Elder 
6 
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left about August 15th, 1998, although one or two of the monthly payments had been made by 
that time by Elder. Tr. at 1358, pp 37-40; 84-85; 91-92. 
V. The Dissolution 
On or about August 15th, 1998, Elder left the business. He ceased and refused to carry on 
any further business with Rutherford. He wanted to wrap the business up, sell the cars, pay the 
debts, cut the losses and close the books. Tr. at 1358, pp. 8-9; 258 & Tr. at 1359, p. 248. 
Creditor Birschbach knew about the dissolution between Elder and Rutherford and 
acknowledges that Elder had nothing to with the business after the middle to the third week of 
August, 1998. In fact, Elder warned Creditor Birschbach to watch out for Rutherford and that 
because of Rutherford the business was not doing well - it was in the negative. . Tr. at 1358, pp. 
10-11; 19-20; 27; 46; 92-93; 98. 
VI. The New Agreement 
Rutherford notified Creditor Birschbach of Elder's dissolution of the partnership. Tr. at 
1358, pp. 45; 92 - 93. After telling Creditor Birschbach that Elder was out, Rutherford and 
Creditor Birschbach met at a football field. There, Creditor Birschbach asked Rutherford how 
the business was going and Rutherford said the business was down about $5,000 to $10,000, 
whereupon a new agreement was entered into. Essentially, Creditor Birschbach and Rutherford 
agreed to carry on without Elder. Creditor Birschbach agreed that Rutherford would carry on the 
business without Elder, assume Creditor Birschbach's contract, and assume and pay the expenses 
that the partnership had not previously paid up to that point time including the represented loss or 
deficit. In other words, Creditor Birschbach would not look to Elder any more for payment. 
Rutherford told Elder what the agreement was and that Elder could move on and not be further 
responsible. Tr. at 1358, pp 45; 92 - 99 & Tr. at 1359, pp. 248 - 250 
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VII. The Course of Conduct after Dissolution. 
After dissolution and after entering into the new agreement, Creditor Birschbach and 
Rutherford conducted themselves consistent with this new agreement - that is to continue the 
business and release Elder from liability. In fact, as of the middle to the third week of August, 
1998, Rutherford took over sole control of the business, subject to the requirements of Creditor 
Birschbach, and assumed the agreement with Creditor Birschbach with the understanding that 
Elder would no longer be involved and that Rutherford would assume the partnership debt. Tr. at 
1358, pp. 86-98 
Rutherford followed Creditor Birschbach's instruction or advice to make an employed 
salesman manager - Mr. Neider. There was inventory on the Murray retail lot, either paid for, or 
bought on the 30 day float, simply turned over to Rutherford and Creditor Birschbach. 
Rutherford, and Creditor Birschbach made a deal to open a new bank account for continuation of 
the business, with Creditor Birschbach and the employee manager, Mr. Neider, being the only 
authorized signers on the account. Elder and Rutherford 's business bank account was closed 
and the account balance, $29,267.27, was transferred to Creditor Birschbach and Rutherford in 
accordance with the agreement to carry on without Elder. All of the books and records were 
turned over to Creditor Birschbach and Rutherford. Creditor Birschbach and Rutherford agreed 
that the payment of the 30 - 60 day $25,000 loan Creditor Birschbach previously provided to 
Elder and Rutherford could be extended to allow Rutherford to make monthly payments of $500 
to $600 per month. Tr. at 1358, pp. 15 - 16; 37 - 39; 49; 84 - 91; 96 - 98, & Tr. at 1359 pp. 251-
252. 
Thereafter, Creditor Birschbach and Rutherford expanded the business to open a second 
car lot in Midvale, Utah, incurring unaccounted for expenses and buying automobiles in 
unknown amounts for that. This was done by Rutherford with the agreement of Creditor 
Birschbach around the first part of October, 1998. Tr. at 1358, pp. 109 -111. 
' "* 
T 
Around the third week to the end of October, 1998, the Department of Motor Vehicles 
notified Creditor Birschbach concerning 10 to 12 vehicles that had been sold but titles not 
delivered. Creditor Birschbach and the employed manager, Mr. Neider, cleared the matters up 
after about 60 days.1 Creditor Birschbach claims he paid $50,000 to $60,000 to clear these 
matters up. Tr. at 1358., pp. 46-49; 101-103. As a result, sometime around the end of November 
or early December, 1998, Creditor Birschbach shut the Murray and Midvale car lots down and 
also shut Rutherford's business down. Tr. at 1358, p. 111. Ultimately, Creditor Birschbach 
sublet the Murray and Midvale car lots out. This occurred, in January, 1999. The Murray Car lot 
was sublet out for even money. The Midvale Car lot was sublet out for a positive cash flow of 
$500 per month. Tr. at 1358, pp. 111 - 113. ;; 
In December, 1998, Creditor Birschbach looked to Rutherford for payment and they made 
yet another deal. That deal was that Creditor Birschbach would hire Rutherford as an 
independent contractor to sell mortgages for Creditor Birschbach's mortgage company and that 
Rutherford would reimburse and pay Creditor Birschbach from his income from selling 
mortgages. Rutherford began working for the mortgage company about January, 1999 with the 
agreement that he would pay Creditor Rutherford $5,500 per month and that he would also be 
credited the $500 per month positive cash flow from the sublet of the Midvale retail lot. Creditor 
Birschbach ultimately fired Rutherford about, July 1998. Tr. at 1358, pp. 112 - 115 
Creditor Birschbach never looked to Elder for payment after his multiple deals with 
Rutherford, except in one instance. That instance was when Garff Leasing, late November, 1998, 
notified Creditor Birschbach of a bounced check. The bounced check was one issued from the 
Elder and Rutherford partnership bank account before Elder left. Elder thought the check had 
cleared at the time he left. When Creditor Birschbach notified him that it had not, Elder checked 
his bank records, met with Garff Leasing, and confirmed that it had not. In late December, 1998 
]That is about the end of December, 1998. 
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or early January, 1999, Elder, with Creditor Birschbach's consent, made arrangements to pay, 
and did pay, one half of that debt. Tr. at 1358, pp. 104 - 106 
VIII. Damages 
Creditor Birschbach's expert called to testify as to damages was an accountant employed 
by Creditor Birschbach's mortgage broker business that let his Utah CPA certification lapse. 
(Buker) Tr. at 1358 pp. 135 - 137. Buker testified that his job was to determine the financial 
condition and standing of Creditor Birschbach's limited liability company, Shar's Cars LLC 
from its inception in 1997 through the end of December, 1998 . Tr. at 1358, pp 140-145. He 
only looked at the records and bank accounts of Creditor Birschbach. He never delved into the 
records pertaining to the Elder and Rutherford partnership. The partnership accounts were not 
used in his analysis. Tr. at 1358, pp. 139, 142 - 145. ^ 
Buker also testified that he could not do an analysis as of August 15th, 1998, (the 
approximate date of Elder's dissolution of his partnership with Rutherford), with any certainty at 
all. He said that his report does not present a full financial picture because it did not include the 
Elder and Rutherford partnership bank accounts - only Creditor Birschbach's limited liability 
company bank accounts. Consequently Buker testified that his report and opinions were not the 
right picture. Tr. at 1358, pp. 146; 147; 149-154. He stated under oath that it was impossible to 
come up with some kind of a number that specifically showed what was owed at the time Elder 
dissolved the partnership. Tr. at 1358, pp. 161 - 162. :•,. 
After the close of Creditor Birschbach's case, Elder called his own expert, Jensen. Jensen 
went through the records of the Elder and Rutherford partnership. Tr. at 1359, pp. 290 - 296. 
But even Jensen testified that in his best guess the amount the Elder and Rutherford partnership 
owed on the balance sheet was somewhere between $25,000 to $50,000. Tr. at 1359, p. 297. He 
also confirmed, as did Buker, that the records were inadequate to come up with anything other 
than a guess. Tr. at 1359, pp 297 - 298 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Elder's first argument, (Point I), is that the trial court was correct in concluding that Elder 
should not be responsible for one hundred percent of the partnership obligations. The Elder and 
Rutherford partnership dissolved about the middle of August, 1998. The partnership did not 
wind up because Rutherford and Creditor Birschbach entered into a new agreement. Under the 
new agreement, Rutherford simply carried on with Creditor Birschbach, assumed the partnership 
obligations and agreed that Elder was released. The new agreement materially altered Elder's 
liability for partnership debt under Utah Code Anno., §48-1-33 (2) &(3), (1953), as amended. 
When applying the elements of Section 48-1-33 to the facts of this case, the trial court did not err 
in concluding that the new agreement between Elder and Rutherford materially altered Elder's 
liability for partnership debt. i 
Elder's next argument, (Point II), is that the trial court correctly concluded that there was 
a release as to Elder's liability for partnership debt. While the trial court rejected the legal 
theories of novation, substituted agreement, accord, satisfaction , waiver, etc. the trial court's 
determination that there was a new agreement and a partial release on that does constitute or is 
the equivalent of novation and/or substituted agreement. When considering the evidence, 
whether called a "new agreement and release on that agreement", or whether called novation or 
substituted agreement, the elements are virtually the same. Based upon the evidence in this case, 
the elements clearly support the trial court's determination that there was a new agreement that 
resulted in a release of Elder's liability for partnership debt. *: 
Elder's third argument, (Point III) is that the trial court erred by failing to conclude that 
Elder was totally released from any partnership liability. Where the partnership dissolved, but 
was not wound up, and the reason that it was not wound up was an agreement between the 
partnership creditor and the other partner to carry on without Elder, assume the obligations and 
release Elder, there is no evidence that would support only a partial release. Rather, based upon 
11 5 
Utah partnership law, specifically Utah Code Anno. §48-1-33 (2) &(3), (1953), as amended, or 
based upon the common law theories of novation, substituted agreement, waiver and/or release, 
the trial court should have found and concluded that Elder was totally released from any 
partnership liability, particularly to Creditor Birschbach.. s 
Elder's next argument, (Point IV) is that the trial court erred in concluding that Elder 
breached the verbal agreement. The crux of a breach of contract claim is the failure to perform 
any promise which forms the whole or part of the contract without legal excuse. While the 
evidence in this case suggests that at the time the partnership between Elder and Rutherford was 
dissolved, there may have been some unpaid expenses, they were not paid because of sufficient 
legal excuse. That legal excuse is the new agreement entered into by Rutherford with Creditor 
Birschbach whereby Rutherford agreed to assume and pay the partnership obligations and 
Creditor Birschbach went along with that and held Rutherford solely responsible. As a result, 
Elder cannot be found to have breached the agreement. 
Elder's next argument, (Point V), is that the trial court erred in concluding that any 
damages were capable of determination with reasonable certainty. The evidence as to damages 
came from two experts, one called by Creditor Birschbach, and the other called by Elder. 
Creditor Birschbach's expert testified that he did not analyze the financial circumstances related 
to the Elder and Rutherford partnership and that it was impossible to come up with some kind of 
number that specifically showed what was owed at the time Elder dissolved the partnership. 
Elder's expert also testified that the records were so inadequate that he could not come up with 
anything other than a guess. The trial court, as part of its ruling, admitted that the evidence as to 
damages ranged anywhere from $220,000 to $25,000 and arbitrarily picked $45,000 as a good 
number. Under such analysis and evidence, proof of damages was purely speculative and the 
trial court erred in finding that there was any proof of damages with reasonable certainty. 
Elder's next argument, (Point VI), is that, if a measure of damages is appropriate, that 
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measure is the partnership's net loss at the time of dissolution, not the actual expenses that may 
have been unpaid at that time. The evidence showed that because of Creditor Birschbach's new 
agreement with Rutherford to carry on without Elder and release him, Elder turned over all of the 
partnership's money, inventory, supplies and all other assets for the benefit of Rutherford and 
Creditor Birschbach. A net loss measure of damages properly accounts for Elder's interest in 
partnership assets. A total expense owed is not an appropriate measure of damages because it 
fails to apply Elder's interest in partnership assets against the debt. 
Elder's next argument, (Point VII), is that the trial court erred and applied the wrong 
standard in denying Elder's motion to dismiss for failure to show a prima facia case of damages 
at the conclusion of Creditor Birschbach's case in chief. The trial court ftiled that if Elder elected 
not to present any evidence in defense of Creditor Birschbach's claims, a different standard 
applied to Elder's motion to dismiss. There is not a different standard. The evidence of damages 
at the conclusion of Creditor Birschbach's case was so speculative and indefinite that a prima 
facia case had not been shown. The trial erred in failing to dismiss Creditor Birschbach's 
complaint at that point. 
ARGUMENT * 
POINT I. The Trial Court Was Correct in Concluding That Elder Should Not Be Jointly 
Responsible for One Hundred Percent of Partnership Debt. 
Birschbach's first contention is that the trial court erred in concluding that Elder was not 
jointly liable for all of the partnership obligations. See Brief of Appellant, Argument, 
Subparagraph "A". His argument is premised upon partnership law which provides that each 
partner in a general partnership is jointly liable for the whole of partnership debt. 
The fallacy behind Birschbach's argument is that it focuses on one limited aspect of 
partnership law; that is joint liability. Birschbach fails to marshal the evidence in support of 
partnership law recognizing that a partner's liability can change. It can change as a result of, as 
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in this case, a new agreement. The trial court specifically found that upon dissolution a new 
agreement was entered into changing Elder's partnership liability. Tr. at 1359, p. 358 
The partnership between Elder and dissolved the middle to the third week of August, 
1998. Dissolution is defined under Utah law as the change in the relation of partners by one 
refusing to be further associated with the carrying on of the partnership business. Section 48-1-
26 defines it as follow: 
The dissolution of a partnership is the change in the relation of the partners caused 
by any partner ceasing to be associated in the carrying on, as distinguished from 
the winding up, of the business. 
Utah Code Anno. § 48-1-26, (1953), as amended. 
The evidence is that Elder was partnered with Rutherford, carrying on a business of 
wholesaling and retailing motor vehicles, beginning early 1998. Elder refused to be associated 
with the carrying on of that business as of the middle to the third week of August, 1998. Elder 
had no further involvement in the carrying on of the business thereafter. (See Statement of Facts, 
Section V, The Dissolution; Tr. at 1358, pp 8-9; 258 & Tr. at 1359, p. 248). Under the 
provisions of Section 48-1-26 the partnership between Elder and Rutherford dissolved the middle 
to the end of August, 1998. 
The dissolution of a partnership does not change a partner's liability for partnership debt. 
The partnership continues until there is a complete winding up of all partnership business and 
affairs. However, the authority of the partners to act for the partnership is terminated. These 
principals are set forth in Sections 48-1-27 and 48-1-30. Section 48-1-27 states: 
On dissolution a partnership is not terminated, but continues until the winding up 
of partnership affairs is completed. 
Utah Code Anno. §48-1-27, (1953), as amended. J 
Section 48-1-30 states: 
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Except so far as may be necessary to wind up partnership affairs or to complete 
transactions begun but not then finished, dissolution terminates all authority of 
any partner to act for the partnership. 
Utah Code anno. § 48-1-30, (1953), as amended. 
Under the facts of this case a winding up never took place after dissolution. A winding 
up never took place because the business was carried on without Elder. (See Statement of Facts, 
Section VI, The New Agreement, Section VII, The Course of Conduct After Dissolution; Tr. at 
1358; pp. 86-98). Nevertheless, under the principles of partnership law stated above, Rutherford 
had no power or authority to bind Elder or act on the partnership's behalf, except to close the 
business up and pay the debts. 
The business was not wound up, closed, or the debts payed, because there was a new 
agreement.2 Utah partnership law recognizes that a partner's liability for partnership debt can 
change based upon such a new agreement, particularly as a result of persons or other partners 
carrying on the business without winding it up. Section 48-1-33, subsections (2) & (3) address 
this circumstance. They state: 
(2) A partner is discharged for any existing liability upon dissolution of the 
partnership by an agreement to that effect between himself, the partnership 
creditor and the person or partnership continuing the business; and such 
agreement may be inferred from the course of dealing between the creditor having 
knowledge of the dissolution and the person or partnership continuing the 
business. 
(3) Where a person agrees to assume the existing obligations of a dissolved 
partnership, the partners whose obligations have been assumed shall be discharged 
from any liability to any creditor of the partnership who, knowing of the 
agreement, consents to a material alteration in the nature or time of payment of 
such obligations. 
2Logic and the law dictate that one cannot carry on a partnership business after 
dissolution and without winding up absent some sort of agreement, manifested either expressly 
or by course of conduct. , 
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Utah Code Anno. § 48-1-33 (2) & (3), (1953), as amended.3 
Under Subsection (2) above, a partner's liability is discharged under the following 
circumstances: 1) Dissolution of the partnership; 2) A new agreement between the partner to be 
discharged, the partnership creditor, and the person continuing the business; 3) The new 
agreement being to the effect that the partner's liability is discharged; and 4) the new agreement 
need not be express but may be inferred simply from the course of dealing between the 
partnership creditor having knowledge of the dissolution and the person continuing the business.4 
The facts support the trial court's decision under the above Subsection (2) that Elder's 
3The entire text of Section 48-1-33 is: 
(1) The dissolution of a partnership does not of itself discharge 
the existing liability of any partner. 
(2) A partner is discharged for any existing liability upon 
dissolution of the partnership by an agreement to that effect between 
himself, the partnership creditor and the person or partnership 
continuing the business; and such agreement may be inferred from the 
course of dealing between the creditor having knowledge of the 
dissolution and the person or partnership continuing the business. ^ 
(3) Where a person agrees to assume the existing obligations of a ^ 
dissolved partnership, the partners whose obligations have been assumed J 
shall be discharged from any liability to any creditor of the partnership 
who, knowing of the agreement, consents to a material alteration in the 
nature or time of payment of such obligations. 
(4) The individual property of a deceased partner shall be liable for 
those obligations of the partnership incurred while he was a partner and 
for which the partner was liable under Section 48-1-12, but subject to 
the prior payment of his separate debts. 
Utah Code Anno. § 48-1-33, (1953), as amended. 
4The significant point with respect to this provision is that the agreement need only be 
inferred from the course of dealing between the partnership creditor and the person carrying on 
the business. Facts as to a course of dealing with the partnership creditor need not be shown. 
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partnership liability was changed and discharged.5 First, the evidence shows that the partnership 
dissolved. (See, Statement of Facts, Section V, The Dissolution; Tr.at 1358, pp. 8-9; 258 & Tr. 
at 1359, p. 248). Creditor Birschbach knew the partnership dissolved. (See, Statement of Facts, 
Section V, The Dissolution; Tr. at 1358 pp. 10-11; 19-20; 27; 46; 92-93; 98). A new agreement 
was entered into between Creditor Birschbach and Rutherford. . (See Statement of Facts, 
Section VI, The New Agreement; Tr. at 1358, pp. 45; 92-99 & Tr. at 1359, pp. 248-250). The 
evidence shows that the agreement was to the effect that the old partner's liability, that of Elder, 
was discharged. (See, Id.). The course of conduct between Creditor Birschbach and Rutherford, 
as well as between Creditor Birschbach and Elder, shows that the new agreement was to the 
effect that Elder's existing partnership liability was discharged. (See Statement of Facts, Section 
VII, The Course of Conduct After Dissolution; Tr. at 1358, pp. 15-16, 37-39; 49; 84-98, 104 -
106, 109-115 & Tr. at 1359, pp. 251-252 ). All of the factual elements in support of the trial 
court's decision of a new agreement that affected and discharged Elder's liability are fully 
supported. The conclusions are consistent with the proper application of law. 
Under the above subsection (3), Elder is also discharged from liability. The elements are: 
1) A dissolved partnership; 2) A partnership creditor that knows of the dissolution; 3) A person 
that agrees to assume the existing obligations of the dissolved partnership; 4) The partnership 
creditor knowing of the agreement; and 5) The partnership creditor consents to a material 
alteration in the nature or time of payment of such obligations. <| 
The facts show that the elements of subsection (3) are also met. Again, the evidence 
shows that the partnership dissolved. (See, Statement of Facts, Section V, The Dissolution; Tr.at 
1358, pp. 8-9; 258 & Tr. at 1359, p. 248). Creditor Birschbach knew the partnership dissolved. 
5While Elder argues here that the facts support the trial court's decision that the new 
agreement affected Elder's liability for partnership debt, he contends as part of his cross-appeal 
that the trial court erred in not concluding that Elder was discharged of liability on all partnership 
debt. 
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(See, Statement of Facts, Section V, The Dissolution; Tr. at 1358 pp. 10-11; 19-20; 27; 46; 92-
93; 98). A new agreement was entered into between Creditor Birschbach and Rutherford. . (See 
Statement of Facts, Section VI, The New Agreement; Tr. at 1358, pp. 45; 92-99 & Tr. at 1359, 
pp. 248-250). Under that new agreement, and in his discussions with Elder, Rutherford agreed 
to assume the existing liabilities and obligations of the dissolved partnership. Creditor 
Birschbach knew of that agreement and was instrumental in its formation. (See, Statement of 
Facts, Section VI, The New Agreement; Tr. at 1358, pp. 45, 92-99, 112-115 & Tr. at 1359, pp. 
248-250). Under the new agreement with Rutherford, Creditor Birschbach consented to material 
alterations in the nature and time of payment of the obligations owed to him. (See, Statement of 
Facts, Section VII, The Course of Conduct After Dissolution). For example, a $25,000 loan 
made by Creditor Birschbach to the partnership on a 30 to 60 day term was extended for 
Rutherford's benefit to allow him to make $500 to $600 per month payments. Tr. at 1358, pp. 
37-40, 84-86. Another example is a material change in the nature of the expenses to be paid 
under the agreement. That is, Rutherford, with Creditor Birschbach's consent, opened a second 
retail car lot, doubling the expenses that were the subject of the verbal agreement. (Tr. at 1358, 
pp. 109-111). The elements of the above Subsection 3 are clearly satisfied and the trial court 
was correct in concluding that Elder's joint and several liability for partnership debt was altered. 
In conclusion, Creditor Birschbach wants this Court to conclude that the trial court erred 
by not finding Elder responsible for one hundred per cent of the obligation owed.6 The problem 
is that Creditor Birschbach fails to marshal the facts in support of the trial court's decision that 
there was a new agreement consistent with Utah partnership law that altered Elder's liability. 
The trial court should not be reversed on this point. -
, i'S 
6Creditor Birschbach contends under his first argument that he was obligated to pay 
expenses of $220,000 which the Elder/Rutherford partnership should have been obligated to 
cover. This argument is addressed below as to damages. The evidence shows that if there is 
$220,000 in damages, they originated from Creditor Birschbach's dealings with Rutherford after 
the new agreement was entered into. 
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POINT II. The Trial Court Was Correct in Concluding That There Was a Release as to 
Elder's Responsibility for Partnership Debt. 
Creditor Birschbach's next argument is that the trial court erred in finding that there was a 
partial release of Elder from partnership debt. See, Brief of Appellant, Argument, Subheading 
"B". Creditor Birschbach's argument on this point is that the facts were insufficient to support a 
finding of release. He speculates that the only evidence admitted at trial that might support a 
release was the evidence relating to a bounced check to Garff leasing where Elder stepped up, 
four months after dissolution of an approximate nine month partnership deal with Creditor 
Birschbach, and agreed to pay half of a bounced check he mistakenly thought had been paid 
before he left. 
This evidence relates solely to the trial court's conclusion on Creditor Birschbach's 
argument that Elder lacked "clean hands". The trial court concluded that Creditor Birschbach's 
clean hands argument failed because Elder stepped up and paid half of the bounced check four 
months after dissolution. No where does the trial court state that this evidence related to its 
conclusion of release. See Tr. 1359 at 359 % 
Not only does Creditor Birschbach's argument fail for the above stated reason, the trial 
court's conclusion of release is amply supported by the evidence as stated under Point I above - -
that is the evidence relating to the new agreement between Creditor Birschbach and Rutherford 
and the course of dealing that took place between them after Elder left. 
On this issue, the trial court found no novation, accord, satisfaction, or waiver. However 
the trial court specifically found a new agreement and a partial release of liability on that. See 
Tr. 1359 at 357 - 360 . This issue relates to semantical differences surrounding legal 
nomenclature - that being the use of "novation", or "substituted agreement", "release", "waiver", 
etc., as opposed to the term as used by the trial court, "new agreement" & "partial release". 
19 
A "novation" is a new agreement. Black's Law Dictionary defines novation as follows: 
"Substitution of a new contract, debt, or obligation for an existing one, between the same or 
different parties." Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., (1979). Under Utah law, whether an 
agreement is a novation is a matter of intent. The essential element is the discharge of one of the 
parties to the contract and the acceptance of a new performer by the other party as a substitute for 
the first original party. See, First Amer. Commerce v. Wash. Mut. Sav., 743 P.2d 1193 (Utah 
1987). And it is a new contract that substitutes in the place of the previous one.7 
Factually, a novation, not a delegation occurred, in this case. There was an existing 
contract. The original verbal contract was between the Elder and Rutherford partnership on the 
one hand and Creditor Birschbach on the other. (See Statement of Facts, Section III, The Verbal 
Contract). There was a new contract. (See Statement of Facts, Section VI, the New 
Agreement). The contract was between different parties. The original agreement was between a 
partnership and Creditor Birschbach. The substituted agreement was between Rutherford, a 
former partner, and Creditor Birschbach. (See Statement of Facts, Section III, the Verbal 
Contract & Section VI, the New Agreement). There was an acceptance on the part of Creditor 
Birschbach of a new performer, that is Rutherford, individually, in substitution of the Elder and 
Rutherford partnership. The intent that Elder was discharged under the new agreement is equally 
clear. The new agreement was that Rutherford would be substituted in place of the Elder and 
Rutherford partnership and that Elder would be discharged. (See Statement of Facts, Section VI, 
the New Agreement). Likewise, the course of conduct after the new agreement was entered into 
demonstrates that the agreement discharged Elder of liability. (See, Statement of Facts, Section 
VII, The Course of Conduct After Dissolution). 
7As explained in the First Amer. Commerce v. Wash. Mut. Sav., case, a novation is 
different than a delegation wherein a contractually obligated party delegates his duties to another, 
remaining liable to the creditor for performance. See, First Amer. Commerce v. Wash. Mut. Sav. 
743 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1987). 
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A "substituted agreement" is also a new agreement. It is a contract accepted by the 
obligee in satisfaction of the obligor's existing duty. It discharges the original duty, and breach 
of the substituted agreement does not give rise to a claim of breach under the original contract. 
The original obligations are merged into the substituted agreement and the original liabilities and 
duties are discharged. Horman v. Gordon, 740 P.2d 1346 (Utah App. 1987). Factually, this 
occurred in this case for the same reasons and upon the same evidence referenced above. 
Additionally, other contract law supports the trial court's decision as to the new 
agreement and its effect upon Elder's liability. These include, executory accord, accord and 
satisfaction, waiver and release. 
More importantly, as explained under Point I above, Section 48-1-33 of the Utah 
Partnership Act sets the rule, incorporating various elements of the common law theories 
described herein above, and dictating how those elements affect liability under partnership law. 
Under Section 48-1-33, Elder's partnership liability was released at least partially, if not wholly.8 
POINT III. The Trial Court Erred in Not Finding and Concluding That Elder Was Totally 
Released from Any Partnership Liability. 
Elder's counter-appeal centers principally on the argument that the trial court erred in not 
deciding that Elder was totally released from any liability to Creditor Birschbach. While Elder 
agrees with that trial court that there was a new agreement and that the effect of the agreement 
was a release, Elder assigns as error the trial court's conclusion that it was a partial release, not a 
whole release. v 
Elder's first argument on this point is that the trial court erred in not concluding that Elder 
was wholly released from liability pursuant to Utah Code Anno. § 48-1-33 (2) & (3), (1953), as 
8On this point, Elder contends that the trial court did err in not concluding that there was a 
whole release of liability as to Elder. 
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amended. As set forth in Point I above, Section 48-1-33(2) calls for the discharge of a partner's 
liability for partnership debt when: 1) the partnership dissolves; 2) a new agreement between the 
partner to be discharged, the partnership creditor, and the person continuing the business is 
entered into; 3) the new agreement is to the effect that the partner's liability is discharged; and 4) 
the new agreement need not be express but may be inferred simply from the course of dealing 
between the partnership creditor having knowledge of the dissolution and the person continuing 
the business.9 As stated under Points I and II above, the evidence clearly establishes each of the 
above elements. 
Likewise under Section 48-1-33 (3), Elder is discharged from liability. As stated under •*• 
Point I above, the elements are: 1) A dissolved partnership; 2) A partnership creditor that knows 
of the dissolution; 3) A person that agrees to assume the existing obligations of the dissolved 
partnership; 4) The partnership creditor knowing of the agreement; and 5) The partnership 
creditor consents to a material alteration in the nature or time of payment of such obligations. 
Again as shown under Points I and II above, the evidence clearly and convincingly shows that 
Elder was discharged from liability. \& 
And, the theories of novation and/or substituted agreement support Elder's contention 
that he was discharged wholly from partnership liability. The elements as set forth under Points I 
and II above and the facts as set forth under the Statement of Facts clearly and convincingly show 
that Elder was wholly discharged from his contractual obligations to Creditor Birschbach. 
POINT IV. The Trial Court Erred in Concluding That Elder Breached the Contract. 
By counter-appeal Elder also contends that the trial court erred in deciding and 
9Again, the significant point with respect to this provision is that the agreement need only 
be inferred from the course of dealing between the partnership creditor and the person carrying 
on the business. Facts as to a course of dealing with the partnership creditor need not be shown. 
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POINT V. The Trial Court Erred in Concluding That Damages Were Capable of 
Determination 
Even if Elder breached his contractual obligations to Creditor Birschbach, the trial court 
mistakenly concluded that damages from the breach were capable of determination with 
reasonable certainty. Damages must be shown with reasonable certainty. Kraatz v. Heritage 
Imports, 2003 UT App 201 71 P.3d 188. The reasonable certainty standard requires proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence. That is that damages are shown with sufficient certainty that 
reasonable minds would conclude that damages were actually suffered. The certainty 
requirement is met when there is sufficient evidence to enable the trier of fact to 
make a reasonable approximation. Id. 
In this case, there was not sufficient evidence to enable the trial court to make a 
reasonable approximation. As stated by the trial court, the evidence relating to damages consisted 
of the following: 1) $220,000 from Creditor Birschbach's expert; 2) $160,000 from Creditor 
Birschbach's attorney; 3) a range somewhere between $25,000 or $30,000 to $50,000 from 
Elder's expert. Tr. 1359 360-361. The trial court further concluded, in answer to Elder's 
attorney's argument that proof of damages was speculative at best, that Elder's expert gave the 
best evidence consisting of a range between $25,000 to $50,000. The court then arbitrarily ruled 
that $45,000 was a good number and awarded Creditor Birschbach half tliat. Tr. at 1359, 3260-
361. 4 
An award of damages based upon speculation cannot be upheld. Cook Assocs., Inc. v. 
Warnick, 664 P.2d 1161, 1165 (Utah 1983). The evidence must not be so indefinite as to 
allow the fact finder to speculate freely as to the amount of damages. Penelko, Inc. v. John Price 
Associates, Inc., 642 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1982). In this case the evidence and the trial court's 
ruling show that the issue of damages was a free for all, anywhere from $25,000 to $220,000. 
Even the best evidence relied upon by the trial court, that of Elder's own expert was qualified by 
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records and any and all other assets relating to the Elder and Rutherford partnership, including all 
the books and records were simply turned over to Rutherford and Creditor Birschbach sp they 
could carry on. (See, Statement of Facts, Section VII, The Course of Conduct After Dissolution; 
Tr. at 1358, pp. 15-16. 37-39, 49, 84-91, 96-98, & Tr. at 1359, pp, 251-252). If the 
circumstances surrounding Rutherford's and Creditor Birschbach's new agreement are 
disregarded, then Elder will have been deprived of any opportunity to apply his interest in 
partnership assets against the liabilities assumed by Rutherford and carried on with Creditor 
Birschbach. Consequently, the trial court's determination was correct, that is using a net loss 
calculation, if damages are appropriate at all. It is an appropriate measure of damages, if 
damages are appropriate at all, where assets are simply turned over to a partnership creditor and 
another party as part of a new agreement. j 
POINT VII. The Trial Court Erred in Not Granting Elder's Motion to Dismiss at the 
Conclusion of Creditor Birschbach's Case in Chief 
T 
At the conclusion of Creditor Birschbach's case in chief, Elder moved to dismiss on the 
basis that Creditor Birschbach failed to put on a prima facie case of damages. Tr. at 1359, pp. 
225, 243-244. The standard here is to view Creditor Birschbach's evidence in a light most 
favorable to him and conclude whether the evidence alone is sufficient. Mahmood V. Ross, 1999 
UT 104, 990 P.2d 933. In this case the evidence at the time Elder moved to dismiss was as stated 
under Point V above. That is that Creditor Birschbach had no idea what might have been owed 
to him at the time Elder dissolved the partnership because of the new agreement. His own expert 
admits that there is no reasonable certainty on that issue and it was impossible for him to derive 
that. ; 
A prima facia case is one where sufficient evidence has been put on and the Defendant 
becomes obligated to put on a defense or lose. The evidence must be sufficiently compelling that 
the Plaintiff would prevail if the Defendant put on no evidence at all. At the close of Creditor 
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**ii v -• »••-.'•- aase, I Klo' moved for dismissal < >n the grounds that Creditor Birschbach faia d a> 
present a prima laua ease r .;. a; - -ia, aoplied the 
wrong standard. I le said' "And let me lurther say ihat n \ i*u K\M. HH: \ .»U make > our arguments. 
T .:.-..',:• .nil"!. =v:*a standard instead . o1 • wp<"i i.* Disnu-N s-• "H tell \«m righiiMw =.: 
not going to grant y, a* virion to Dismiss - • = , , ! J 
closing, then it's a different standard" h a- ! U1^ p. 244 
There is not a viiUeieiu stanua * - ' •-* * • >i 
any element vi the cause ol action, whether brought at the conclusion m the Plaintiffs ca^ .> Mt 
t . - > • - : o ; a u 4 a defense Indus
 t j ^ Plaintiff simply failed 
to nuike nut <)i prinia iacia as u» damages 1 .^ - ; ^ n ^ k-i -hiLin •• e: 
dismiss should have been granted. 
Based upon the foregoing, this Court should reverse the trial court's conclusion that there 
\\,r, onk ,i partial ivlrise <»' lu • - . '<•• *: . Hi ment entered m fa\ or of Creditor 
Birschbach in the amount of $22,5 Ui \ 1 ii i s v * :• t a I ' a it -1 E i u a i so remaiiu -a % ase f 
with instructions directing that coi in io enter ap oidci dismissing Creditor Birschbach's 
compia a • : . . . - . ; 
DATED this / / day of August, 2003. 
Qt£ /< £>£•«/• 
J C r f K. RICE 
Attorney for Appellee, Deloy Elder 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE • 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, 
postage prepaid and first class, this / / day of August, 2003, to the following: 
STEVEN G. LOOSLE 
KRUSE, LANDA, MAYCOCK & RICKS, LLC 
50 West Broadway, Suite 800 (84101) 
P.O. Box 45561 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0561 
K62^ 
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